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Is There One Right Answer to the
Question of the Nature of Law?
Dan Priel*

Sir James Stephen is not the only writer whose attempts to analyze legal ideas
have been confused by striving for a useless quintessence of all systems, instead
of an accurate anatomy of one.
(Holmes 1897: 475).
In Europe, charters ofliberry have been granted by power. America has set the
example ... of charters of power granted by liberry.
(James Madison, quoted in Bailyn 1992: 55).

1. Introduction
For some time during the late 1970s and early 1980s Ronald Dworkin's claim that
there are uniquely right answers to virtually all legal questions was the subject of
heated debate. But as often happens with such debates, it eventually ran out of
steam, even though neither side succeeded in convincing the other. It may therefore
seem a bit odd to return to this topic now. IfT do so, it is because I wish to examine
it from an angle that I think it has not yet been looked at, and which I think is
relevant to some debates that are ve1y much alive these days. More specifically,
I will argue that there is something about the right answer thesis that fits a certain
view prevalent in American political culture about politics and (consequencly)
about the relationship between law and politics, and that this view is quite different
from the British mainstream view about law and politics. The more general and
more important goal of this chapter is to challenge the underlying idea of the search
for the na~ure oflaw, at least so long as it is understood as a conceptual inquiry char
purports to tell something about law outside the different political and cultural
environrrienrs in which different legal systems operate. Somewhat surprisingly,

* I rhank participants at the Nature of Law Conference at McMaster University for their comments,
and especially to my commentator at the conference, Kevin Walton, and to Stefan Sciata.ffa, for his
detailed written comments.
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many of the very same legal theorists who have argued vigorously against the view
that there is a single right answer to legal questions accepted (or actually, assumed)
this position at the meta-level inquiiy on the nature of law. I think this is
assumption is mistaken, and my chapter is an attempt to ·explain why.

2. Changing places
Returning to his native Britain after a year in the United States, Hart recorded his
impressions for the BBC. 1 These were then published in the BBC's magazine The
Listener. This brief piece, "A View of America/' reflects Han's astonishment with
what he saw there. Coming from a country that was still slowly recovering from two
wars thaL had left it practically bankrupt, H art was dearly enthralled about the tall
buildings, the wide roads, the big cars, and the bountiful universities. But apart
from that, the essay also contains some pertinent comments about American
politics and how different they were from what he was used to at home. One
thing that particularly impressed Hart was
I

the passion inspiring so many whom you meet for the moral issue. Argument soon breaks
through co what is believed, apparently, to be at the root of every problem-a moral
problem. And, more widespread than I could have believed, was the conviction that just as
there lurks at the bottom of almost every problem a moral question, so there must somewhere
be an answer, an answer perhaps for the sage-and he may be in the university- to provide.
(Hart 1958: 89)2

This is also a fairly neat summary ofDworkin's right answer thesis. This description
would not be so surprising to those who know something about the debates that
would come to dominate legal philosophy in the following decades had it not been
for the fact that Hart wrote chis some five years before Ronald Dworkin published
his first article. And yet Hart was not talking here not about American law but on
American policies. This, as l will try to show, is not a coincidence.
Unlike Hart, who only made a few visits to the United States, Dworkin lived and
taught in Britain for many years. But he always remained, I think, a relative outsider
to the legal and political culture in Britain. He has been, for example, a frequent
commentator on American constitutional cases in the New York Review of Books,
but to the best of my knowledge has never written a similar essay on a British case.
He has seen enough, however, to note the differences in the political cultures of the
two countries, writing once that "public debate in the United States is dominated,
to a degree British commentarors find surprising, by discussion of what rights

1 Though what I write about may be more accurately described as English, throughout the chapter
l mostly talk about Britain and British law. Those troubled by this term should read "England" and
"English law" instead wherever these terms appear. Though less loaded, "American law" is also not free
from difficulties. Again, I stuck wirh chis phrase aware of its imprecision. I believe chat in neither case
does my choice of word get in the way of my argument.
2 Surprisingly, even though Nicola Lacey discusses this little essay at some length in her biography
of Hart (2006: 193- 6), she does not ,mention this remarkable passage.
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people have" (Dworkin 1985: 31-2). Dworkin's most derailed discussion of British
law and politics is found in a relatively unknown pamphlet (or is it a book?) entitled
A Bill of Rights for Britain. Summarized in a sentence, in this essay Dworkin
recommends that Britain's law and politics be turned into something more or
less like their American counterparts. He writes there that in order for people to
"participate in government ... constantly through informed and free debate ...
Parliament must be constrained in certain ways in order that democracy be genuine
rather than a sham" (Dworkin 1990: 33, emphasis in original). 3 Such a change, he
suggested, might make "[!Jaw and lawyers ... begin to play a different, more
valuable role in [British] society than they now even aim to have." It would
encourage courts to "think more in terms of principle and less in terms of narrow
precedent." Such a change would help foster "a legal profession that could be the
conscience, not just the servant, of government and indusuy" (Dworkin 1990: 23).
In short, Dworkin recognized that there are fundamental differences in the political
culture of Britain and the United States, and that those had fundamental implications for the way lawyers perceived their role in society.

3. Two ways to the rule of law
I want to suggest that these reflections on the political differences between the
United States and Britain that both Hart and Dworkin noticed are relevant to legal
philosophy. At this stage I will phrase my argument as weakly as I can: since law
interacts with politics, the fact that different political communities have different
conceptions of politics is likely to have an impact on their conception of law as well.
I will examine this argument in rhe concext of one aspect of the rnle of law, namely
that of the requirement that the content of the law not be affected by the identity of
the person charged with expressing it. This sense is sometimes captured by the
slogan "the rule of law and not of men," and is associated with one sense of
objectivity, that of non-perspectival constancy or invariance. Put in eve1yday terms,
it is the demand that if different people are asked to state what the law says on a
particular question, they will (typically) offer tbe same answer, even if their political
views are different. (This, of course, is not the only sense of the rule of law.)
When legal philosophers address the question they usually do so by trying to
connect debates about objectivity in law to the subtle and sophisticated discussions
of objectivity among philosophers where the topic has been front and center of
virtually every field of philosophy. These jurisprudential contributions provided
important correctives to those who rejected the possibility of objective knowledge
as naive or even reactionaiy. However, in focusing on the question of objectivity in
these senses they shifted attention away from the issues that lawyers are mostly
interested in. For lawyers do not usually wonder about whether Truth exists, or the
ontological building blocks of Reality, bur they are intensely interested, practically

3

These days Dworkin (2011: 398-9) has somewhat softened his support for judicial review.
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interested, in potential problems that could undermine objectivity in the sense
I associated with the rule of law. The worry is that people's personal (possibly
unconscious) prejudices, their political opinions, or cultural background, will affect
their determination of the law thereby undermining the possibility of invariance
among different people.
The unique problem of objectivity in law can thus be summarized as follows: (1)
law should be (in the specific sense explained above) objective; (2) law (in modern
society) primarily is concerned, directly or indirectly, with the relationship between
individual and the state; (3) questions of this sort are often politically controversial;
(4) legal provisions are often written in vague language that can be interpreted in
different ways, and therefore (5) law's objectivity is in danger. More informally, the
worry is that, especially in the modern welfare state, there is tension between the
aims for objectivity jn the law and many of the issues it is made to handle.
Setting up the problem at this level of abstraction is fairly easy. What makes
finding a solution to it difficult is that the issue is not simply one of finding the
optimal design of legal institutions to minimize a dearly set problem. Part of the
difficulty arises from the fact that the understanding of the problem itself changes in
different political environments, and therefore that there are several possible ways of
understanding what would count as a successful solution to it. One way of
understanding my argument below is that we can identify a difference in the
mainstream legal academic positions in Britain and the United States not simply
about the means of achieving an agreed optimal level of separation between law and
polirics, but on what kind of relationship between law and politics is desirable. To
complete my argument about the error in the way debates about the nature of law
are currently conducted I will need to show, first, that the relationship between law
and politics is relevant to debates about the nature of law; and second, that different
answers to this matter- and as a result different understandings of the nature of
law-are going to be given in different political cultures.
My argument below can be summarized as follows. I will first argue that the
British response to the problem identified above is to uy and keep law away from
political questions, whereas the American response has seen various attempts for
allowing courts to address political questions without entering the political fray.
I will then argue that we can see exactly these different responses in the respective
works of Hart and Dworkin.·The third step is to show that these competing views
mark competing understandings of what law is, which at least in part are the result
of competing understandings of politics.

3.1. The British response
The traditional, and still typical, response in Britain to the potential challenge that
politics poses co the rule of law is co insist on a categorical separation of law and
politics. "To call a court 'political' is merely to deny it the character of a court of
law" (Oalceshott 1975: 412). This distinction is maintained through the more or
less conscious adoption of various institutional mechanisms aimed at minimizing
the potential infiltration of politics into the law, and no less importantly, oflaw into
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poHtics. Some of these means for achieving rhar goal are rather familiar, others
perhaps less so. I mention only a few of them here:
(1) Parliamentary supremacy. In the course of a discussion of rhe differences
between the United States and Britain Hart wrote how the "defenders of the British
governmenc>s policy had come ro think nor merely rhar Parliament had unlimited
legislative powers as a matter of English constitutional law but that it was a general[,]
necessary and indeed self-evident rrurh rhat government by law could not be
limited by law,, (Hart 1976: 551). Hart's point was that though the matter was
presented as a conceptual truth ir was merely a reflection of a particular political
choke, one that could be easily refoted by pointing, a~ Hart himseJf did in his
critique of Austin, to the United States as a counterexample (Harr 1994: 72-4). 4
The fact is, however, that though there were some who sought to present the matter
in this conceptual fashion, the opposition to legal limitations on Parliamentary
power was always thoroughly normative. To its proponents Parliamentary sovereignty was a good idea.5 One of the good things about Padiamentaiy sovereignty
was that it created a dearer separntion between legal and political matters, and made
it less likely that courts would be embroiled in the son: of political questions that
could compromise their objectivity. This remains a fundamental pillar of British law.
(2) Judicial deference to government action. Another doctrine used to keep law
and politics apart has been a very deferential approach to executive action. The
general attitude of British courts cowards a judicial mindset has been described by a
prominent legal historian as one of "total deference to the executive" (Stevens 1978:
320). 6 A broad doctrine of justiciability, an almost uninterrupted discretion to
public authorities (under what British public lawyers call "Wednesbury unreasonableness")/ and narrow scope for tort liability of public authorities, have all served
to keep executive action relatively free from legal oversight. Of course, one can find
examples of all that in other places as well, but in comparison to courts in other
Western democracies, and more specifically in cornpai·ison with American comts,
in much of the twentieth century British courts were remarkably timid (Stevens
2005: 31- 46). British courts did not, until the last few years, develop a detailed
protected rights jw·isprudence that set limits to legislative and executive action, as
these were deemed inimical to Pai·liamenta1y sovereignty.
(3) A non-political process ofjudicial appointments. Judicial appointments in
the UK are made on the basis with relatively li ttle influence by politicians, and are
based on an assessment of the legal ability of the candidates. This, of course,
contrasts sharply with the fashion in which judges in the US are typically

Many others have made this point against Austin before Hart, e.g. Bryce (1901: 89- 94); Si~vick
(1897: 25- 8).
5 A sununary of the overwhelmingly political arguments against such limitations is found in
Goldsworthy (2001: 233-4).
G Also Stevens (1978: 388-9): "parliamentary sovereignty implied that there should be no serious
judicial questioning not only of aces of Parliament, but of decisions of the Civil Service."
7 So called after /l;sociated Provincial Pictm'I! Houses v. Wednesbmy Corporation, (1947) 1 KB 223
(CA).
4
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appointed, either in popular elections (in most states) or by a highly politicized
nomination process (in the federal courts).
(4) Focus on doctrine in legal education and legal scholarship. What does it mean
to be a good lawyer? In the best British law schools chis still means, to a degree chat
would astound American law professors, mastering a vase amount of legal rules by
reading a breathtal<lng number of cases, while giving relatively little consideration
to questions of social policy. In a l<lnd of feedback loop mechanism doctrinal legal
education is both a product of and a mechanism for maintaining the separation of
law from politics: today's students are lawyers and judges of the next generation,
and they continue to litigate, interpret, and develop the law in the same fashion.
This is not merely a matter of legal education: doctrinal, ''black-letter" scholarship-ranging from the brief case note to the comprehensive treatise- is a genre
still accorded great respect among British academics. One of the marks of this kind
of scholarship is the view that the solution of legal problems is still primarily to be
derived from legal materials. As a result even what counts as "theoretical" work in
Britain is geared much more towards conceprual analysis or the internal taxonomy
of legal categories than to the examination of the law from an interdisciplina1y
perspective and it often lacks the explicitly normative orientation which is more
common in American legal scholarship. This kind of scholarship fosters the view
that law and politics are separate domains: social scientific data or political theory
belong to politics, "internal" answers derived from the analysis oflegal materials are
the domain of lawyers.

3.2. The American response
The American scene is different. It was already in the first half of the nineteenth
century that Tocqueville famously wrote "[t]here is hardly a political question in
the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one" (Tocqueville 2003: 315 [§I.2.8)). 8 And this enchantment with law as a central location for
political battle has greatly intensified since.
One source of all these differences is the United States Constitution, understood
primarily as a legal document that empowers courts to declare certain legislation
unconstitutional and that has no equivalent in Britain. Another difference was
pointed out by Hart in the ve1y same essay from which I quoted above:
For [the English], surely, libercy is this: that there is a circle round each man, inside which he
can do as he please, and it is no concern of others; this is the libercy the Englishman has
inside his house and garden and behind its hedges. T think that this as an ideal makes little
appeal to an enormous number of Americans; 1 believe you can find what the American
means by liberty by looking at the Constitution of an American State. In the State of
Massachusetts the Constirurion provides that any member of the public may introduce a

8 It is true that some have questioned Tocqueville's claim (Graber 2004; cf. Schauer 2005), but
though it is true that not all political questions become judicial questions in the United States, it is true
that American courts have been involved in many politically contested questions, especially in
comparison to British courts.
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measure into the Legislature and argue for it before committees. And ir seems ro me thar this
is what an American means by liberty; the right to take part in what he would call "the
decision-making process". (Hart 1958: 89)9

Simply put, politics is a more participatory affair in the US than in Britain, and
going to court is one way of participating in politics in the United States. To be
sure, there have been many critics, both popular and academic, of the excessive
legalism in American life, complaining about too many laws, too many lawyers, and
too much faith in the redeeming powers of law. But these persistent complaints
need to be repeatedly made exactly because of the staying centrality of law in
American political life. They need to be mentioned against a background of
statements such as "[l]itigation is an important political activity: courts exercise
political authority, modify substantive laws, and allocate resources .... Litigation
declares and changes fundamental cultural values" (Abel 1987: 454-5). 10 (It is hard
to imagine such a statement being made in the British context.)
The result of all this is a very different understanding of the relationship between
law and politics in American law from the way this relationship is understood in
Britain. This makes the fears oflaw becoming indistinguishable from politics more
pressing; at the same time it implies that many of the institutional solutions for
maintaining the rule oflaw that were adopted in British law are simply not available
in the United States, and it requires the adoption of different institutional solutions
to match the ve1y different problems that arise when courts actively engage in
politics. Once again I can only mention briefly a few of them.
(1) Giving up.

.l

Perhaps the most radical response to the difficulty is to give up
on rhe attempt to maintain the separation between law and politics. The nomination proceeclings of Supreme Court justices are now televised and nominees are
assessed in quite openly political terms. In many states judges are elected and can be
removed from office by the public. There is a thriving industry of scholarship
produced by political scientists assessing court decisions in terms of their political
orientation, and in response to the challenge that the law is political some scholars
have even openly celebrated the contribution ''political courts" make to the
American polity (e.g. Pet·etti 1999). The situation in Britain could hardly be
more different. As one of the few political scientists to take an interest in the
workings of the courts put it, "[i]t is possible for students of British government to
pursue their studies in blissful ignorance of the contents of even the existence of the
law reports" (Drewry 1985: 373; Drewry 2009). Compared with literally hundreds
9 Once again Hart captured here Dworkin's view years before he himself articulated it. Dworkin
(2011: 365)"conrrasts one view ofliberty according to which IJberty consists in the idea that "people
must be permitted to play a role in their own coercive governmenc: that government must in some
sense or another be self-government" with another according to which "people must be free of coercive
government over some substantial range of their decisions and acdvities." Dworkin, of course, defends
the former.
10 Or consider the following words from Bogus (2001: 41): "American common law is both more
democratic and more dynamic rhan its British counterpart. The people play a larger role in American
than in British common law, and the common law plays a larger role in the American than in the
British system of governance."
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of books and articles by political scientists examining the extent to which courts are
inAuenced by politics, there is an astounding dearth of studies of chis sort in Britain.
This lack of scholarly interest can only be explained by the assumption that law and
politics are largely separate.
(2) Theories ofinterpretation. It is not often noted, but there is no British equivalent to American lawyers' obsession with theories of interpretation. This work, at
both the statuco1y and constitutional level, is, at bottom, an effort to find a way to
be able to identify the content of law in a way chat both acknowledges the political
content of the law, but tries to keep law apart from it. This is evident in approaches
such as originalisrn and rextualism, which are presented as the only antidotes to the
dangers of politicization of the law. But the same is true of other approaches too.
Dworkin, for example (whose approach I discuss below), addresses this difficulty by
acknowledging the political character of the law, but argues that the right interpretive methodology can avoid the dangers associated with political courts. These
debates are required because of, and can be understood as institutional solutions to,
the role of American courts in politics.
(3) Economic analJsis oflaw (and "theoretical" scholarship more generalb). Economic
analysis of law has proven a remarkable success in the United States, but it has not
had much impact in Britain. It is tempting to explain this disparity by appeal to the
American obsession whh theo1y and contrast it with English anti-intellectualism,
but there is, I think, a deeper reason for this difference. In the British context
economic analysis is perceived as an alien influence that could potentially lead to
undermining the integrity of the law (its "self-understanding"). It is thus not merely
pointless, it is potentially dangerous. I suspect that the success of economic analysis
of law has much to do with the need to maintain objectivity in the face of law
deeply infused with politics. Since doctrinal analysis is no longer perceived as
sufficiently robust co prevent the politicization of the courts-this is the realist
legacy that has never had much impact in Britain-economic analysis is (or was)
conceived as a non-political alternative. At least in its initial stages, it was promoted
for its ability to provide precision and objectivity that traditional methods of legal
reasoning lacked.

* * *
I could list many other ways in which the fundamental differences in understanding
the relationship between law and politics manifest themselves in these two legal
systems. Political activism in the United States is quite often Legal activism; there is
much less of that in Britain. (Of course, chis may only reflect political activists'
prediction that such a course of action would be a waste of time and money; but
that is exactly the point.) In addition one may mention the attitude towards judicial
review, the different attitude towards deciding politically controversial matters
(abortion, slave1y, health care), and consequently, the very different place of law
in public discourse (US Supreme Court decisions are commonly front page news,
but those of its British counterpart much more rarely) . If I were co summarize the
difference between the two positions in a sentence I would put it this way: the study
of the American Constirutioi:- is, by and large, a study of American constitutional
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law; the study of the British constitution is, to a much greater degree, the study of
British politics.
No doubt the sketch I offered above is ve1y schematic, and on each side there is
now growing appreciation of the virtues of the opposing view. In Britain even
before the adoption of the H uman Rights Act there were those who sought to find a
basis for judicial review of legislation in the principles of the common law. In the
United States, after years in which judicial review was perceived as the greatest gift
American politics has bestowed on the world, there are now those who argue that
the US will be better off without it. But in both cases these are still minority views
and they are battling very entrenched ideas. It is also possible that British law may
be criticized by showing that all the institutional mechanisms mentioned above that
are aimed to keep law outside politics fail to do so, and that in fact British law is no
less political than American law. And yet at least at the level that legal philosophers
seem to be interested in, that of officials' attitudes from the internal point of view,
the "self-understanding" of British law(yers) is fundamentally different from that of
American law(yers).

4. Back to the jurisprudential fray
I suspect the response of many legal philosophers to what I have said so far will be
that it is all ve1y interesting, perhaps even true, but that this is not jurisprudence,
and has little to do with its concerns. For the general view among them is that "in
spite of many variations in different cultures and in different times, [law] has tal(en
the same general form and structure,, (Hart 1994: 240). Most legal philosophers
accept this statement without argument and have consequently left all the matters
I discussed in the last section to others: this is hisro1y, or politics, or perhaps
constitutional the01y or comparative law; this is not jurisprudence properly so
called.
What I will try to show is that these matters are relevant to jurisprudence, and
indeed have in fact been at the background of some well-known jurisprudential
debates. I begin by examining the respective views of Hart and Dworkin and show
that they reflect very different views on the relationship between Jaw and politics,
and ones that are in accordance with the dominant view on the matter in Britain
and the United States, respectively.

4. 1. The different ways of understanding the connection
between law and politics
I began· by distinguishing between Hart and Dworkin's perceptions of the other's
native count1y and I suggested that their respective theories of law may have been
influenced by their perception of the law in their own native count1y. This
suggestion is not usually well received among legal philosophers. Michael Moore,
for instance, considered it the sort of mistake one occasionally hears from students
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who a.re just embarking on their jurisprudential studies (Moore 2000: 80- 1; for a
similar atti tude see Endicott 1998). Nonetheless, I will try to demonstrate that
there may be deep and important truth in this view.
As the quotes above demonstrate, Ha.re has clearly·recognized the differences
between American and British political cultures, and has also recognized the very
different role of politics in American and British law. None of chis, apparently,
made him question the existence of a single nature to law. His brief references on
the interaction between law and politics, made in the context of discussing
American law (Hart 1983: 124-5) did not suggest to him that they had anything
to do with what law is. And yet, aspects of his general account reflect the British
approach to this relationship which he imperceptibly generalfaed to claims about
the nature of law in general. One place where this is particularly evident is Hart's
discussion of adjudication. It is, as he later admitted (Hart 1994: 259) a fairly
cursory discussion (which is in itself revealing and unlikely to happen to an
American only a few years after Brown v. Board of Education). What is found
there is striking, for when Hart has to explain the sources of indeterminacy in the
law, he focuses almost exclusively on the inherent vagueness of natural language
(Hart 1994: 127- 9): It is clear that a car is a kind of vehicle, but it is less clear
whether a bicycle is. In other words, the main source of disagreement is not political
divergence at the foundation of the legal system (or in his terminology, different
people having different rules of recognition due to their different political backgrounds), but rather a local, linguistic disagreement at the periphery of law. It is
only when law runs out and the judge is required to fiU a void when there is no
more law to follow that she wiU have to consult her moral and political views.
Thus, the British approach to the problem of objectivity mentioned above- thac
of keeping law and politics separate-becomes a central tenet in Hart's account of
the nature of law. Matters a.re very different with Dworkin. For him the constant
contact between law and politics is perhaps the central background problem that
calls for solution, the rnajor threat to the possibility of objective law. Tt is for this
reason that he begins his critique of Hart by pointing out that when disagreements
occu~· in the law their source is usually political, not linguistic. Dworkin therefore
starts his analysis at a point that rhose who wish to maintain the separation of law
from politics would already find unacceptable: "Judicial decisions," he says, "are
political decisions" (Dworkin 1978: 88). Thus, the separation between law and
politics, in the way it is understood in British law-two (largely) non-overlapping
domains- is off the table from the stalt. Instead, Dworkin seeks to solve the
problem of objectivity by relying on a distinction between what I will designate
as "politics" and "Politics." (The terms are mine.) The former is what one sees on
TV: spin, personal attacks, simplistic slogans, talking points instead of argument; it
is also the kind of things that give politics a bad name: logrolling, filibustering, the
adoption of unprincipled position for the sake of personal promotion. For politics
Dworkin has nothing hue contempt. Debates preceding "legislative decision[s]
about some great issue of principle" are "rarely" of "high quality." Rather, such
"[o]rdinary politics generally aims ... at a political compromise that gives all power-
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ful groups enough of what they want to prevent their disaffection, and reasoned
argument elaborating moral principles is rarely part of or even congenial to such
compromises" (Dworkin 1996; 344-5; also Dworkin 1985: 146). By contrast,
Politics is commitment to principle through the exploration of the moral requirements involved in living in a community. He says, for instance, that in a community governed by ''the model of principle" members of the community "accept that
they are governed by common principles, not just by rules hammered out in
political compromise." And he adds: "Politics has a different character for such
people. It is a theater of debate about which principles the community should adopt
as a system ... " (Dworkin 1986: 211). ll
What is the role of law in this? Dworkin's answer is that law, properly understood and practiced, is true Politics. The first step in the argument is that "our
government shall be republican rather than despotic'' (Dworkin 1996: 111, also
345, for a similar emphasis on a "republican" view oflaw), and the recognition that
what I called "politics" "destroys civic republicanism" (Dworldn 2000: 234, also
369, where Dworkin links the "degraded and negative" political discourse in the
US to the claim that Americans cannot claim "with a straight face, to be governing
[them]selves"). The second step is that law is the main means for promoting this
republican ideal:
We have an institution that calls some issues from the battleground of power politics to the
forum of principle. Ir holds out the promise that the deepest, most fundamental conflicts
between individuals and society will once, someplace, finally, become questions of justice.
I do not call that religion or prophecy. I call it law. (Dworkin 1985: 71) 12

Law and lawyers thus have a dual role within the American polity: one is to elevate
politics to Politics by providing a model ofwhat political discourse should look like;
the other is to limit the domain of politics by transferring certain questions from
politics to law (and thus to Politics) ifpolitics cannot be transformed into Politics.
The first strategy is in view in Law's Empire when Dworkin argues that political
decision making should be based on the same principles and reasoning that guide
legal decision maldng (Dworkin 1986: 184- 6; Dworldn 2006). 13 Elsewhere
Dworkin explains that political institutions could rise to the level of Politics only
under what he calls "partnership democracy," which, as its name indicates, is
distinctive for its participatoty view of democracy-one that works to encourage
the kind of political debate he sees in judicial proceedings.
However, when the political community fails to create this form of democracy
Dworldn is clear in favoring the second strategy: "individual citizens can ... exercise

11 For comparison consider Crick (2000: 32), a book that has a good claim to be the classic view of
politics in Britain: "'Politics' ... simply summarizes an activity whose history is a mixture of accident
and deliberate achievement.... ft is not as such motivated by principle. ... Political principles are,
whatever they are, principles held within politics." See also Crick (2000: 47).
12 Dworkin (1996: 345) offers a (highly romantic) explanation of how law achieves this. Friedman
(2004: 1290-1) makes precisely the same point.
13 I criticize the position of Dworkin (2006) in Priel (2007a).
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the moral responsibilities of citizenship better when final decisions involving
constitutional values are removed from ordinaiy politics and assigned to courts,
whose decisions are meant to turn on principle, not on the weight of numbers or
the balance of political influence" (Dworkin 1996: 344; also' Dworkin 1978: 85).
The judge's role in this debate is not chat of a follower (of rules set elsewhere), but
primarily as that of a moral leader. For chis reason we even find in Dworkin, an
exhortation for (as Hart put it) "the sage ... [who] may be in the university" to
provide the right answer to political questions. 14
Accepting that, the question still remains how we can know-even in a pai·tnership democracy-that such debates would give us the objectively right answer to
the questions of Politics. The ai1swer, quite simply, is that the right answer is the
best answer to come our of the debate. This crucial point about Dworkin's position is
central to his thinking: the right answer is not "out there," it is simply what emerges
as the "winner" in a principled debate. It is always a tentative winner, because it is
always open to challenge, but an objectively right answer rneans, for him, nothing
more than the best answer so fai· found, the one that we have been convinced cannot
be successfully challenged, in proper political (i.e. Political) discourse.
What is often missed in jurisprudential discussions of Dworkin's work is the
extent to which his account reflects a view that is fairly familiai· within American
legal discourse. To see this we must step outside the naiTow bounds of analytic
jurisprudence, although because of space limits I can provide here only one detailed
example. 15 In an essay first published in 1981 (now reprinted in Fiss 2001) Owen
Fiss has sought to address the challenge to objectivity posed by certain thenemerging critical scholars. Proponents of this "new nihilism" contended, as Fiss
put it, that "[a]ll law is masked power" (Fiss 2001: 151). Fiss's response was
somewhat different from Dworkin's: unlike the latter who denied the intelligibility
of external criticism Fiss acknowledged it and even relied on it to distinguish
between internal legal criticism and external ethical (or religious) criticism. But
what looks at first like a significant difference turns out to be quite small, for as Piss
put it, "[e]ndogenous change is always preferred ... [and therefore t]he external
critic struggles to work within the law ... " (Fiss 2001: 159; also 160-2, for an
elaboration on the ways in which appeal to morality is required to maintain the
objectivity of law) .
One need not accept Fiss's romanticized view ofAmerican law co recognize in his
words a particular vision of addressing the challenge to the objectivity of law, one
14 Recall: "The courts arc the capitals oflaw's empire, and judges are its princes, but not its seers and
prophets. It falls ro philosophers, if they are willing, to work out law's ambitions for icself, the purer
form of law within and beyond che law we have" (Dworkin 1986: 407). To the same effect, Dworkin
(2011: 109).
l5 Another Famous example char is superficially very different but bears some deep unmistakable
resemblance to Dworkin's ideas is Wechsler (1958), contrasting "the ad hoc in politics" with the
"judicial process ... that ... muse be genuinely principled" (l 958: 15), and who, interestingly, contrasted his approach to that caken by the House of Lords (1958: 17). There are also looser links
between Dworkin's idea and much other work that has sought to reconcile the republican ideal of
self.government of "We che people" of the Constitution with the higher law, the "unalienable Rights,"
mentioned in che Declaration of independence, and the role of law in answering this question.
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that seeks to find it through engagement in moral and political debate within an
"interpretive community" (Fiss 2001: 170). The judges' authority derives from the
face chat they "are insulated from the political process" (i.e. what I called politics),
but that is so in order for them "ro engage in a special kind of dialogue over the
meaning of [public] values" (i.e. what I called Politics). This judicial engagement
with public values is "an essential part of the process through which a morality evolves
and retains its public character" (Fiss 2001: 199). For chis reason "courts should not
be viewed in isolation but as a coordinate somce of governmental power, and as an
integral part of the larger political system" (Fiss 2001: 54, also 34-5). 16
The view reflected here, then, is not simply that moraliry contains right answers
to moral questions, and since morality is part of the law, law contains right
answers too. (Note also that it has nothing to do with whether motality is a
condition of validity.) At bottom Dworkin's view holds that law can transform
political debate and in this way avoid the probkm of objectivity: following his
prescription is what it means to find the right answer co moral questions. If one
accepts this view the audacious right answer thesis becomes trivial, you might even
say tautological. But in the Hardan perspective it is almost incomprehensible.
Because Hart does not recognize the distinction between two kinds of politics, on
his view when politics is introduced into the law, political disagreement is simply
"reproduced" in the law. It is hard to see how that could aid the search for legally
correct right answers or guarantee the objectivity oflaw. This view is evident when
Hart criticizes those who think chat "there is no central element of actual law to be
seen in the core of central meaning which rules have, that there is nothing in the
nature of a legal rule inconsistent with all questions being open to reconsideration
in the light of social policy" (1983: 72, emphasis in original; Shapiro 2011: 327-9,
argues against Dworkin on the basis of a similar attitude). For Hart to recognize the
existence of law is to recognize a domain in which politics, even Politics ("social
policy"), cannot touch. 17

4.2. Legal validity?
What we have seen so far is that the relative sepatation oflaw and politics in English
law replicates itself in Hart's account of the nature of law, whereas the deep ties
between law and politics in American law are at the heart of Dworkin's theory of
law. That chis fact has not received much attention is not, I think, a coincidence.
Unlike Lhe connections between law and morality, the interaction between law and

16 Anoth~r similar suggestion is found in Barber and Fleming (2007: 156): the right approach co
conscitulional interpretation, they say, "can only mean an interpretation of the Constitution that cries
to redeem its expressed claim to be an instrument of justice, the general welfare, and the other goods
listed in the Preamble." Such examples could be easily multiplied.
17 The t:wo jurisprudential views thus reflect two opposed views on rhe place of law in practical
reasoning. Hart's positivism sees law as concerned with guidance, and dear guidance requires replacing
moral reasons. Dworkin's view sees law as concerned with participation and ultimately in selfgovernmenr, and hence sees the point oflaw in engaging people Jn moral reasons. The issue is explored
more fully in Pricl (2012b).
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politics has been marginalized in analytic jurisprudence. Perhaps this reflects the
dominant view thal morality is constant and therefore the relationship between it
and law is (fairly) constant too. (This is true also of moral anti-realist legal
philosophers such as Kelsen or Alf Ross. 18) As such the' law/morality borderline
seems to match an inquiry into the nature of law (as currently understood) much
more than the shifting boundary between law and politics. But in ignoring the law/
politics divide legal philosophers may have missed the most important challenge to
their search for a single nature to law. The purpose of this section is to show in what
way the differences identified above between British and American law about the
place of politics, and the corresponding differences between Hart and Dworkin,
reflect a difference that does not merely reflect different variations on a single nature
of law, but must be understood as competing amwers to the question "What is law?"
To the extent that the question of the relationship between law and politics is
addressed in jurisprudential literature it is typically located in the rule of recognition.
According to a poptJar view (found already in Harr 1994: 71, 106, 247) whereas the
Americans have adopted a constrained sovereign, the British have not. Translated to
the language of contemporary jurisprudence tMs means that moral considerations
mal{e up part of the American rule of recognition but not part of the British one.
There are various problems with this claim, not least that it assumes that what is
at stal<e between competing jurisprudential theories are different perceptions of
legal valjdity. 19 In the present context, this view fails to capture the sense in which
the British constitution is fundamentally a political, not a legal, entity (it is difficult
to talk about a "document" in this context). It is a constitutional structure in which
"(e]ve1ything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened that would
be constitutional also" (Griffith 1979: 19). 20 It is from this that law is understood
as simply the voice (the "command," if you don't mind the Austinism) of whoever
happens to be in power. Sovereignty on this view is the power to make laws. It is a
power that the otherwise unlimited sovereign can choose to create legal limits on its
law-making power. This is, effectively, the way Hart interprets the US Constitution
(Harr 1994: 68- 9), and this is how today the Human Rights Act is reconciled with
the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. By contrast, in the United States
sovereignty is ultimately understood to vest in the people (Wood 2002: 159- 62),
and the Constitution, created by the people, is thought to award some limited
powers, including limited law-malcing powers, to the different branches of
government. As such .the law is understood fundamentally not as the manifestation
of political authority, but as what sets its limits (cf. Bailyn 1992: 175-81, 185-8,
201- 3). In the British picture judicial engagement in politics is ultimately an

is Though popular (especially among philosophers), the view that morality is largely unchanging is
not universally accepted. My view is that Dworkin, despite his endorsement of moral objectivity,
rejects this position. This by itself is a significant aspect of his work, that is very relevant to understanding his jurisprudence, but not one I can consider here.
19 I challenge this view in Priel (20lla).
20 Griffith's terms arc stark, but the idea is an old one. Bagehot expressed a similar idea when he said
(1963: 221) that "The ultimate authority in the English Constitution is a newly-elected House of
Commons." On the decline of the idea of fundamental law in Britain see Gough (1961: 168-207).
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illegitimate attempt to usurp political power, to undermine the sovereign; in the
American one, judicial engagement in politics is an (almost) inevitable outcome of
the need to make sure governmem does not exceed its given powers.
This is the philosophical divide that makes intelligible so many of the differences
between law and politics between the two countries. These two views emanate from
two very different underlying political theories about what makes the use of
political power legitimate, and they shape the most basic features of what law is
in these two countries. Yee in the present picture all this is created as irrelevant to
understanding the nature of law, quite possibly exactly because these differences are
the result of competing political theories. But once we see chis, much of what I said
above tllat was inexplicable in the "validity-first" pictW'e that is dominant in
contempora1y jurisprudence begins to make sense. It is not simply that the United
States and Britain have different tests of validity. It is that they have different
political traditions, which result in a different understanding of what law is, which
in tum explains numerous practical differences between their legal systems.

5. T he implications for the search for the nature of law
John Gardner once described Dworkin's work as that of a "theoretically ambitious
lawyer" (Gardner 2004: 173), suggesting that for all that is valuable or interesting in
it, it is not really legal philosophy. I suspect my argument would be classified in the
same way: indeed, exactly because my discussion reveals such differences between
American and British law it might be judged irrelevant to the question of the nature
oflaw. I suspect what I have said so far might be similarly dismissed as insufficiently
philosophical. There were just too many facts, too much histoty, perhaps even too
much law, to count as proper legal philosophy. These are exactly the kind of
contingent matters that legal philosophet's consider to be the domain of others.
Rather than a reason for criticizing legal philosophers, one might say my discussion
so far shows chat they have been correct to ignore all these matters.
In proper philosophical style, then, let me present a syllogism:

(1) T here is no right answer to what constitutes cctrue" politics, or no single
account of the legitimacy of the state; there is, if you wish, no non~political
((nature" to politics to be discovered through conceptual analysis.
(2) Different states have different forms ("conceptions") of politics that reflect
their different values, traditions, and history.
(3) The1:e are connections between law and policies.
(4) Different understandings of politics result in different roles, understandings,
forms ("conceptions") of law in different states.
(5) The different conceptions of law go to the heart of what on any plausible
view of the matter counts as the nature of law.
Hence: (6) The search for the (single, unique) nature of law is misguided.
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I did not argue for (1), but I assume (and hope) it would not be controversial.
Denying it is hardly going to help the search for the nature of law, for that would
only mean that for the sake of an account of the latter, legal philosophers (unless
they deny (3)) would have to develop a side-specialty of identifying the true
nature of politics. In any case, my demonstration of (2) above can be seen as
validation of (1) as well. (3) too is, I think, uncontroversial. It is the remaining
premises, (4) and especially (5), that are likely to evoke most resistance, but my
argument in the last section has shown, I hope, rhe ve1y different understanding
of politics in the two countries, and how they result in a profoundly different
understanding of what law is. To reiterate just one point noticed by Hart, the
dominant idea of freedom in Britain saw it as the opposite of law; in che United
States, freedom was a product of law. This is a fundamental divide that explains
not just the fundamentally different understandings of what counts as law, but
also many of the lower-level differences between law in these two countries. The
alternative advocated here to the prevailing jurispruden rial orthodoxy claims that
these facts must figure in any attempt at depicting the "nature" of American and
British law. I argue that any inquily that purports to account for law's "selfunderstanding" but cannot account for these differences, fails in the cask it secs for
itself.
Those who wish to reject my argument might contend chat at best what it
shows is the need for mal<lng discussions on the nature of law more abstract.
Now, of course, one may define the term "nature of law" any way one wishes
and it is definitely possible to define it to mean those necessary features we
happen to find in all legal systems. Even then I thinl< my argument above
shows that one is likely to find much less than most legal philosophers seem to
think. More importantly, even if the nature of law simply means those things
that are necessarily true of all legal systems, one would then wonder why
this question is of any interest: Is philosophy in the business of collecting
necessa1y truths about things in the world? The search for the nature of law was
presumably considered worth engaging in because it was believed that by
engaging in it one could learn something valuable about a certain social
practice; it was believed that the search for the nature of law was somehow
illuminating of the law. The solution suggested here avoids the challenge posed
by giving the term -''nature of law" a purely technical meaning and by stripping
this l<lnd of inquiry of value. This solution to my challenge, then, looks more
like an admission of defeat.
If the search for the nature of law is to be meaningful, and if it is to bear some
resemblance for what most people mean when they talk about the "nature ofX" or
"essence of X," namely an inquiry that gives us the most significant aspects of a
certain phenomenon, such an inquiry should be understood in quite different
terms. I propose, informally, that a fact belongs to the nature of a thing if it
explains many other facts about it. Slightly more formally, a fact F is part of the
nature of social practice S if (and only if?) it figures in an explanation of many
features of S. Even the more formal definition is still imprecise, but for my purposes
here it will do. I propose th~t the way the relationship between American and
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British law and politics is pan of each legal system's nature, as defined here, for one
thing we have seen above is that the relationship between each legal system and
politics was part of the explanation of very many aspects of each; and though I have
said nothing about it, they are also relevant for explaining some of the differences
between the content of the laws of those legal systems.
All this does not amount to a logical proof, but it does amount to a demonstration that two legal systems have a very different understanding of what law is as a
result of their different political traditions and their corresponding differences in
understanding the relationship between law and politics. There is, however, a
logical challenge I can direct at defenders of the nature of law project: the issues
raised in this chapter can be deemed irrelevant only ifAmerican law and British law
belong to the same kind, otherwise the differences between them are simply irrelevant to the question of each legal system's respective nature. In other words, there is
a different way of understanding my argument, i.e. as the claim that American law
and British law are different kinds, in which case the set of facts I described about
each law may be necessaiy for understanding its nature but irrelevant to understanding the nature of the other. Put differently, my point is that when proponents
of the prevailing understanding of nature of law rely on examples from both British
and American law in support of their views on the nature of law, they assume
without argument that the two are species of the same kind. However, from a
logical point ofview there is warrant in doing so and there is no telling whether they
are right on this matter. Since there is no fact of the matter on this question, the
assumption that they are-an assumption that is crucial for the entire enterprise of
the search for the nature of law-is unwarranted. Furthermore, this assumption can
only make sense if one implicitly assumes some further substantive views about what
law is. The whole enterprise is thus in some sense circular as it can only get off the
ground by presupposing the truth of certain premises that are presented at the end
of the inquiry as f£ndings about the nature of law. (This problem is complicated
many times over when other legal systems, contempora1y, historical, some may
even want to add hypothetical, are added to the story.)
To amplify this last point imagine you had been asked to offer an account of the
nature of American law or the nature of British law, a sort of account of the central
features of the legal system, one that includes the self-understanding of lawyers in
each of these legal systems as to the enterprise they are engaged in. We could
conclude that British and American law belonged to the same kind only at the end of
our inquiry if we found our that the accounts of each that we had previously offered
turned out to have a roughly identical core and that their cUfferences were only
confined to those aspects rhat we had not considered as part of either legal system's
core. But if we attempted to undertake such an inquily and found out that the
accounts were conflicting at their core that would imply that these two legal systems
do not belong ro the same kind. My claim in this chapter is that when we do just
that, it turns out lhat the two legal systems indeed conflict at their core. Of course,
I may be wrong about that, but until something like this is tried- and I know of no
legal philosopher writing on the nature of law who tried to do that-the entire
project rests on wholly question-begging assumptions.
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Perhaps, however, we may understand the search for the "nature of law" more
weakly, i.e. as noc actually concerned with finding the nature of law. Instead this
term might simply designate an attempt to look at law from some greater distance,
without any commicmenc to classificat01y accmacy. Is the difference between my
views and those of legal philosophers looking for the nature of law nothing more
than that chey prefer the long shot view whereas I am more interested in the close
up? I do not deny that standing at some "distance" from a phenomenon can reveal
what a closer look may miss Qackson and Pettit 2004). Even understood in this
more relaxed way, however, there is a serious problem with it, for if this is the
reason for the search for the nature oflaw, then the right distance from the object of
inquiry is not to be determined by the object·of inquity. Rather, it must be chosen
by legal philosophers according to criteria that are external to the object ofinquiry. As
on this view there is no correct degree of "zoom," the only appropriate way of
choosing between various possible distances must be determined according to what
we gain from the explanation. If that is the case, my view is that in their search for the
nature of law legal philosophers have been standing too far from the law, and that
some of the debates that preoccupied legal philosophers in the la.st few years under
the banner of the nature of law were deeply unilluminating of their object of
inqui1y. Don't tal<e my word for it: on this interpretation of the search for che
nature ofJaw a good test for the optimal "distance" from an object of inquiry is the
degree of interest others find in it. The fact that both legal academics and moral and
political philosophers (let alone practitioners or lay people) have not found much of
irtterest in these debates, is more than suggestive of the fact that the distance from
the object chosen by legal philosophers has been the wrong one.
Opting for the distant explanation can also lead to the opposite problem, viz. the
tendency to assume the local and familiar is general and universal. I have al ready
suggested what may be a problem in the work of both Hart and Dworkin: an
assumption that one can extrapolate from the legal system one is familiar with to
universal claims about the nature of law. Let me illustrate this point with another
example. A few years ago there was an internet debate on the question why A11gloAmerican legal scholars cake relatively little interest in the work of Hans Kelsen and
in deontic logic, both topics on which legal philosophers from continental Europe
write much more. The debate attracted many prominent legal philosophers, who
offered various explanations.21 I read this exchange and was struck by the fact that,
with the exception of one fleeting comment (by an Italian, made with regard to
Kelsen), no one mentioned what I thought was the obvious explanation. Kelsen's
legal thought, despite his many yea.rs in the United States, remained firmly rooted
in a particular conception oflaw that is closer to what one finds in civil law systems.
Once it is recognized that for all its abstraction Kelsen's approach fits some legal
systems better than others, the puzzle is solved. The same is true of deoncic logic.
Deontic logic would be considered importan t for analyzing legal argument in a legal
See <http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfSblawg/2007/1 O/why-no-deontic-.htinb; <http://prawfs
blawg.blogs.com/ prawfsblawg/2007/1 O/why-no-kelsen.hunl>; <http://leiredegalphilosophy. rypepad.
com/leitcr/2007I10/why-dont-amer71.htmb (all visited, April 8, 2011).
21

- - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - -·-·- -- ·--

340

- - --

Dan Priel

system that puts a premium on deductive argumentation. This is exactly what one
finds. A prominent German legal scholar has recently written that even today "[t]he
typical German judgment, like its French counterpart, strives after the ideal of
deductive reasoning" (Zimmermann 2005: 27, also 38; similarly Markesinis 1986:
366). By contrast, legal philosophers &om common law jurisdictions, told from
Day One of law school that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience" (Holmes 1881: 1), 22 are much less likely to think that deontic logic is
going to capture anything important about the law.
I point out these vestigial localisms in supposedly general theories of the nature
of law not in order to castigate particular legal theori~s for their insufficient
generality, but to point out that legal philosophers' tendency to stand far away
from legal practice, their relative lack of interest in the nitty-gritty details of the
organization of particular legal systems, all adopted in the name of the search for the
nature of law, may actually result in too quick generalizations from few familiar
cases and thus undermine the inquily for the nature of law.
Perhaps noticing the difficulties with talking about the nature of law in general,
several legal philosophers have turned in recent years to talking about "our" concept
of law (e.g. Raz 2009: 94-5). Unfortunately, this seemingly more modest claim
suffers for the same problem of demarcation: Quite simply, there is no logical way
of demarcating "our" concept of law without circularity unless we have a nonquestion-begging way of demarcating who "we" are, and none of those who
suggested this possibility has even hinted towards a way of addressing this question.
This is not a fanciful complaint. In challenging the search for the nature of law
I relied not on anthropological studies of small pre-industrial communities living in
the thick of the Amazon rainforests, not on the law of an ancient and now extinct
political community, not on the law in contemporaiy Russia, 2 3 not even on the
distinction between common law ai1d civil law that some have suggested involved
some fundamentally different ways of thinking (Legrand 1997). I looked at the
two legal systems from which the most prominent analytic legal philosophers
hail, two legal systems that share a long histo1y. If"our" does not include both of
them, I do not see what this word is supposed to cover.
At this point the challenger may reply that I am wrong to say that we have no way
of knowing that American and British law ai·e not the same kind: after all, people "treat
them as belonging to the same kind, which is why, for example, they consider it a
valuable exercise to compare them. This response, however, is both unconvincing
and self-defeating. It is unconvincing, because it is asserted rather than shown. The
fact that people use the same word to describe both is not sufficient to tell us that the
word is used to refer co the same kind.
e are, after all, repeatedly reminded that
legal philosophy is not lexigraphy.) This usage is perfectly acceptable for everyday

rw

22 Several American philosophers (e.g. Dewey 1924; Cohen 1916) have expressed similar views on
law. Many other statements expressing the same idea from English and American judges and scholars
arc found in Waddams (2003: 1- 2).
23 For example Ascherson (2004): "when [Putin] says 'law' he means what we would call 'order'."
The issue is discussed further in Kahn (2006) and Kurkchiyan (2003).

I

[

ls There One Right Answer to the Nature ofLaw?

341

purposes, but it does not require commitment to the view that the things described
by the same word share certain necessaiy fearures. In fact, my guess is that if you
asked some British lawyers what they thought ofAmerican law, many of them would
reply "it has the appearai1ce oflaw, but it really is politics masquerading as law," 24 or,
more politely, that American law is a ve1y different beast from British law. This
answer is also self-defeating because if we take people's attitudes seriously then we
should pay at least as much attention to their profound thoughts and self-understanding of their own legal system as to their superficial comparisons with others. Put
differently, one cannot invoke people's attitudes at one point and ignore them
completely at another. And it has been exactly my claim that those attitudes are
profoundly different in Britain and the United States.

6. Some further objections answered
I foresee four additional objections to the position taken here. The first is that the
argument must be wrong because the existence of a debate on the question of the
nature of law shows that there is something that the disputants are talking about.
Andrei Marmor (2001 : 6) once wrote that "controversy over the content of a rule of
recognition does not prove chat there is no such a rule. Even when there are several
ways of understanding a rule (or anything else for that matter), there must be
something there that people can understand differently and argue about." Though
the context of this remark was different, Marmor' s parenthetical remark shows he
considers his point to be general. Transferred to our context the argument would be
that the fact that people disagree about the nature of law shows that such a thing
exists. Unfortunately, this is a bad argument. Controversy may be the result of
shared mistaken beliefover the existence of something that in fact does not exist. No
one (I hope) would infer rhe existence of God merely from the existence of debates
about the nature of God. In our context, debates about the nature oflaw could exist
so long as participants share the mistaken belief that such a thing exists. The
pmpose of this chapter is exactly to challenge this belief.
A second objection is the opposite of one of the objections considered above, i.e.
that I have been tendentious in my choice of two very different legal systems for
discussion. There is American exceptionalism (including American legal exceptionalism) on one side and British exceptionalism (in not having a written constitution)
on the other. If I had chosen different countries, I would not have gotten such
different outcomes. There are, however, several problems with this objection. One
is, of course, that in some respects the American and the British legal systems are
fairly close: they are both legal systems of Western developed countries with a long
shared history. And as already mentioned, these happen to be the cow1tries from
which the most prominent analytic legal philosophers come from, and it is very rare
indeed to hear them thinking of either (or both) of these legal systems as somehow
24

I have not conducted a survey but Srevens (2009: 651) and Birks (1996: 98- 9) come close co

saying just that.
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an outlier in the search for the nature oflaw (especially when the whole point of the
search for the nature of law is to find those features from which there are no
outliers). 2 5 The most important point, however, is that the moment one scam
looking closely, virtually eve1y country is "exceptional" in one way or another.
French law and German law are the paradigmatic examples of civil Jaw jurisdictions, and yet there are important fundamental differences between them; German
law has served as the model of much Chinese law, but there are fundamental
differences beLween German and Chinese law as well. This does not entail (nor did
I argue) that each legal system has its own "nature,>' or even that nothing
illuminating can be said about law in general. It says,. however, that in order to
identify without circularity what belongs to the object of inquiry one must identify
a certain role that law plays within a certain social or political organization. Because
of the variety of such organizations, it cannot be assumed in advance that the thing
called "law" in all of them will have the same nature. This is only something we
could find at the end of our inquity.
This point leads to the third challenge, and that is that my argument in fact
shows that law has a nature, namely that the law is concerned with objectivity. The
critic may even go on to quote me saying cl1at there is "tension between the aims for
objectivity in the law and its subject-matter." Can I make this statement without
assuming law has some nature? This is an important point for clarifying the scope of
my argument. First, as already said, I do not deny that there are certain observations
true of both American and British law (and quite possibly of other legal systems).
There may even be observations true oflegal systems more generally. But to observe
at legal systems and notice some things they have in common is not philosophy,
and it is best done with recognized fact-gathering techniques that, to put it gently,
are not the mark of contemporary legal philosophy. Second, there may be some
"philosophical" questions (whatever that means exactly) that arise with regard to
many, perhaps even all legal systems. But these «puzzles,, (as I called them in Priel
2007b: 193-5), need not, singly or together, amount to anything that could
plausibly be called the nature of law (unless one uses this term in the purely
technical sense mentioned above), nor do these puzzles become less puzzling if
they are found to be true of only some legal systems. Most importantly, there is no
reason to think in advance that even if the same puzzle arises in all legal systems,
that the answer to it will be the same in all legal systems. To pick a favorite puzzle, it
is perfectly possible that we will have one explanation for the normativity of law in a
contemporary modern welfare-state democracy and quite another one in a medieval
feudal society. We have seen a different understanding of the relationship between
law and politics between British and American law; the differences may be even
greater in a place where an absolute monarch declares "the state is me.,, Since law is
not something that falls on societies from the sky with a note "take me or leave me,,

25

Atiyah and Summers (1987: 256, 411-20) is a rare (and perhaps for this reason neglected)
exception.
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attached, it can be (and has been) molded according to the particular political
culture in which it exists. No one doubts the truth of this claim as far as the content
of law is concerned; what I do here is extend it to the deeper and more general
elements of different legal systems.
The last objection I can foresee is that what I have ·argued so far is a kind
of a skeptical claim. As such it may be an amusing intellectual game, but like other
skeptical claims we should really ignore it and go on with our daily business,
including philosophers' daily business, which has always been the identification
of the nature of things. However, if my claim is "skeptical" in any sense, it is
skeptical only with regard to a particular, and in historical terms recent, understanding of jurisprudence. In the English-spealcing world it was not before John
Austin that jurisprudence was understood in this way (and I would argue that even
he is a questionable case). Before him there is simply no one that I know of,
definitely not Bentham or Hobbes, who was concerned with the question of the
nature of law in the manner chis term is understood these days. It was only around
fifty or so years ago that Anglophone legal philosophy turned in earnest to this
question (in German-language jurisprudence things may have begun a bit earlier);
this happened at a particular point in history, when other branches of Anglophone
philosophy were also interested in questions of a similar lcind. And yet in other areas
these questions were fairly quickly abandoned: already in 1979 Brian Barry, who
knew a thing or two about the time and place in which this sort of inquiry
flourished, wrote mockingly about questions of this sort, "I cannot remember
when I last read a djscussion about the criteria for a good cactus or an extra-fancy
apple" (Barry 1979: 632). 26 It is, I think, no coincidence that the revival in political
philosophy, pronounced dead in 1960s, took place at the time that interest in such
"conceptual" questions declined, and by now, in many branches of philosophy the
search for the "nature" of things has come under attack and has been largely
abandoned. 27

26 But unlike ocher areas of philosophy this sore of question seems to be alive and well in
jurisprudence (Dickson 2009). le is notable that it is mostly legal positivists who seem concerned
with these sorts of questions, whereas natural lawyers like Finnis and Dworkin dismiss them as
unimportant. This should have alerted legal positivists co the face that these nacural lawyers are not
in the business of giving an analysis of tbe nature of law, but racher of giving a political (non-neutral)
account of law. Many of the apparent tensions Dickson finds in the work of Finnis (Dickson 2009:
170-3), disappear if this is realized. In che case of Dworkin, che matter is discussed in more detail in
Priel (201 Ia).
2 7 Sec e.g. in metaphysics: Van Fraassen (2002): chapter 1 entitled "Agafost Analytic Metaphysics;"
in epistemology Stich (1990: 19-21): section entitled "The Irrelevance of Analytic Epistemology;"
Kitcher (1992); .in ethics Darwall ec al. (1992: 123): describing how "[m]oral philosophers shed the
obsessions of analytic metaethics;" Timmons (1999: 15-30): describing the move from analytic to
post-analytic metaethics); in philosophy of mind Fodor (2004); and generally Harman (1999). They
could all be wrong, of course, but to suggest that abandoning the search for che nature of law is
somehow anti-philosophit"al displays lack of awareness on what some of the world's leading philosophers think is (and is nor) philosophy.
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7. From the nature of law to human nature?
Does this mean that it makes no sense to talk about the "nature" oflaw? If we mean
by this term what most legal philosophers have given it in the last fifty yea.rs, then
I believe the inevitable answer is "yes. "28 The only way to avoid the problems
raised here is to engage in normative inquiry. Whatever its faults may be such an
account would not suffer from the problem of circularity identified above. Such
an account can be more sociological or historical-seeking to understand the
development of law in a certain time or place, to answe.r what law was for those
living then, or it can be more directly normative, seeking to explain where law fits
within a political theory, what law must be in order to be legitimate. On certain
assumptions the latter account may be universal in the sense that it applies in all
places, not in the sense that it exists in all places. (Claiming universality for such
an account presupposes chat there is one way law may be legitimate, and chis
assumption may be false.)
Perhaps, however, there is a completely different way of thinking about the way
to get co a universal account of the nature of law. Perhaps the nature of law is not a
matter to be discovered by a priori reflection on law, but rather by looking more at
humans and their nature. This idea may sound new, but it is in fact one as ancient as
jurisprudence, and it is only the lack of interest of most legal philosophers in the
history of their subject (prior to 1961) that may have obscured this point. It is part
and parcel of the natural law tradition, and it is also central to the work of those
often considered the first legal positivists, Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham.
Since this organizing idea has been rejected, probably with the work ofJohn Austin,
jurisprudence has been losing its way (Priel unpublished). 2 9
A conrribudng factor for the lack of interest in human nature may have been the
skepticism towards the idea in the humanities and social sciences around the time
Hart published The Concept of Law. More recently, however, the idea of human
nature has undergone something of a revival. Building on work in psychology and
anthropology that idencified numerous traits and habits found in all human
societies (Pinker 2002: 435-9, passim), there have been some attempts to extend
these ideas to law (Kar 2006; Guttentag 2009; Mikhail 201 1). Without passing
judgments on any of the particular ideas defended in these works, I will say that
I am sympathetic to the view that scientific findings could contribute to questions
that have traditionally been thought co belong to philosophy (Priel 2011 b; Priel
28

For the sake of completeness 1 should add that my argument here is not the only one I have
advanced against rhis sort of inquiLy. Others appear in Priel (2007b, 2008). Against the "case study"
approach of che pre.sent chapter, the approach taken in these two essays in more abstract.
29 In Hart (1994: 193- 200) we still see the remains of this approach in the brief discussion of the
minimum content of natural law. It contains some, broadly Humean, remarks about human nature,
but even these are mostly negative (i.e. an attempt to chaJlenge what he considered co be mistaken
views about human nature espoused by natural law theorists) and their relevance for undemanding the
content laws are likely to have, but not the basis for Hart's positive account oflaw. Even this minimal
concern for human nature is gone in more recent work by legal positivists, who have cold us that an
account of the nature of law must be able to explain what law is even for non-human societies.
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20 l 2a). It is worth bearing in mind, however, char at this stage the research this
work is based on is still conrroversial, and irs relevance to jurisprudence raises
additional difficulries. I cannot discuss these issues here, but I wish to highlight two
points about how different this approach would be from the currently dominant
view in jurisprudence. First, these inquiries rely heavily on factual discoveries of
social and cognitive scientists, whose methods are ve1y different from those used by
contemporary legal philosophers. Second, the substantive results of this approach
are also likely to look quite different from those of contemporary jurisprudence.
The "direction" of their argument is from human narw·e to the nature oflaw, rather
than from observations abour law to the natme of law. Fully cognizant of rhe fact
that there are considerable differences between legal systems, this sort of approach is
unlikely to try to distil rhe few features that mal<e something into a legal sysrem, but
rather try and identify what facts about human nature entail (if anything at all)
about the shape legal institutions are likely to take. Though the aspiration is to
identify some such universal tendencies among humans, it does not require the
discovery of necessary truths.
What such inquiries might reveal about law is not a topic I can address in a few
pages. The only purpose of the discussion has been to show where I think legal
philosophers should be looking if they seek more universaHst findings about law in
general. But ending on this note may seem to undermine the thrust of eve1ything
I have said before. That, however, is not a challenge to me, but to reality. It reflects
one of the most difficult questions in the explanation of all of human affairs, namely
how to reconcile the fact of universal human nature with the fact of immensely
different cultures. Swings in popular and academic opinion on the matter-the
sixties and seventies were the "relativistic" decades, and now universalism is on the
up3°-reflect the extent to which this complex question may be influenced by
shifting fashions, bur it seems clear that there is quite a bit of both in all human
societies, and that a complete account of social institutions would have to rake
account of both.
Legal philosophers may have thought that they could contribute co the universal
end of the inquily by taldng on questions that seemed to be independent of
scientific inquiry and even human nature: the "nature" of law is not a question
that seems amenable to scientific inquhy (Priel 20 l 2a), bur the difficulties with this
sort of inquity, some of which have been shown here, make this alternative
unattractive. The universalist alternative proposed here avoids these difficulties,
bur poses a different challenge to legal philosophers. Puc bluntly, it seems to leave
little room for philosophical contribution now that the research on human nature
has largely been taken up by scientists. This means legal philosophers will have
to rethink what they are doing. One possibility is for them to serve as a kind of

°

3 Consider the following titles: The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language (Pinker
1994): "The Moral lnsrinct" (Pinker 2008); The Art lmtinct: Beauty, Plemure, and Human Evoltttion
(Dutton 2010); The Faith Instinct: How Religion Evolved Why It Endures (Wade 2009); "The Property
'Instinct'" (Stake 2004); "Is There a Law Instincr?" (Gutrenrag 2009); The Compassionate Instinct: The
Science ofHuman Goodness (Keltner er al. 2010).

346

Dan Priel

go-between ttying to connect the general, scientific inquiry on human nature with
the diverse, normative examination of diverse social institutions. Beyond that, legal
theorists will have to turn to political theory and explain the place of law within it.
Thus, in the end, we reach a conclusion similar to the one I have made in the
beginning of this section: jurisprudents are most like to mal{e a real contribution by
adopting a more consciously normative approach to legal theory, one that relies on
scientific findings on human nature for the sake of a better theo1y of the proper role
of law. To do that, however, legal philosophers must be willing to open up their
discipline both to political the01y and to scientific work on human nature.

8. Conclusion
This has been a story with a twist. Much of the work in jurisprudence of the last fifty
years has been concerned with the discove1y of objective tmth about the "nature" of
law. What I have argued here is that to find the answer to this question one needs to
understand the way the idea of objectivity in law is understood, and how different
political traditions have led to different characterizations of law in response to the
problem of objectivity. If one accepts that there is no one way of understanding the
relationship between law and politics and that the way this relationship is understood
touches upon and affects the most basic aspects of what law is, then it follows that
there is also no single answer to the question of the nature of law.
Why has this conclusion eluded some ve1y sophisticated thinkers? One reason
must be that the debate about the nature of law has been framed as a debate about
the relationships between law and morality. But the focus on the relationships,
necessary or otherwise, between law and morality has obscured from view questions
about the relationships between law and politics, questions which arguably are far
more important for understanding law in the modem regulatory state. Understanding the law-politics relationship calls for more attention to law's daily workingsthe way judges understand their position in relation to other branches of government, the way judges are appointed, th.e way they write their opinions, the way law
is taught, as well as the way political elites perceive the right way of solving social
problems. It requires a broader view of what law does: It is no coincidence, I think,
that when legal philosophers write about substantive law they focus on common
law areas, those that fit the law- morality divide far better than areas such as
securities regulation or administrative law (which highlight the law- politics divide).
One of the unfortunate impllcations of the focus on the "nature" of law within
jurisprudence is that those working in jurisprudence have come to see all this as
irrelevant· detail, not sufficiently interesting or impo1tant for serious philosophical
reflection. The result has been a growing gulf, almost a conceptual separation,
between law and jurisprudence. If nothing else, I hope this chapter has shown that
this has not helped make jurisprudential debates more philosophically sophisticated
or better focused, and it has not helped to get us closer to finding the general features
of law.
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